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Certificate for Safe Emergency Shutdown of Wind Turbines*
Rafael Wisniewski, Mikael Svenstrup, Andreas Søndergaard Pedersen, and Christian Sigge Steiniche
Abstract— To avoid damage to a wind turbine in the case of
a fault or a large wind gust, a detection scheme for emergency
shutdown is developed. Specifically, the concept of a safety
envelope is introduced. Within the safety envelope, the system
can be shutdown without risking structural damage to the
turbine. To demarcate the boundary of the safety envelope,
a protection certificate, is computed. To this end, a model-
based framework of barrier certificates is used. As a result,
the protection certificate problem is formulated as a sum-of-
squares program with the optimisation criterion related to the
volume of the safety envelope. The framework enables the
inclusion of a bounded wind disturbance and the a priori known
emergency shutdown procedure. For this purpose, the model
of a wind turbine is developed that includes structural safety
critical components.
I. INTRODUCTION
By and large, this work aims at providing a protection
mechanism, which ensures that the wind turbine avoids
excessive structural loads by initiating a timely shutdown.
Specifically, the protection system takes over and shuts down
the turbine when the wind, a controller or an actuator behaves
in a way that can damage the wind turbine.
In particular, the goal is to find out when to initiate a
shutdown of the turbine in order not to break it down. This
entails that specific states of the turbine must not exceed a
specific maximal value during shutdown. This is illustrated
by a two dimensional example in Fig. 1. The white area XA
is the set of admissible states. Accordingly, XcA, the com-
plement of XA, consists of states where a damage of a wind
turbine can happen. The green area is the region of normal
operation. The red curve exemplifies a shutdown trajectory;
the shutdown is initiated at t0, when the state trajectory exits
the safety envelope XD. Explicitly, the shutdown trajectory
is a solution of the wind turbine equations of motion with
the specific shutdown controller (not the nominal controller).
The aim of the work is to find the safety envelope XD, which
is the set of all initial states of the shutdown trajectories that
never exits XA. Obviously, finding the set XD might not
be tangible. Nonetheless, a successful method relying on the
computation of the invariance kernel has been developed for
planar systems [1].
The problem studied in this paper is relaxed by the task of
finding a subset X ′D of XD, maximal with respect to a certain
criterion discussed in Section IV. Since X ′D ⊆ XD the
turbine will also be safe by using X ′D as a safety envelope.
Specifically, the set X ′D is defined as a sub-level set of a
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function, dubbed a protection function. In conclusion, the
protection function determines the time of shutdown that
ensures that the shutdown trajectory stays within XA during
shutdown. To pronounce the resemblance between the above
problem and the barrier certificate problem [2], we will
call the task of finding a protection function - a protection
certificate problem.
Fig. 1: A 2-D illustration of the protection certificate prob-
lem. The normal operation set XN is shown as the green
area. The white area, XA, is the admissible set, i.e., the set
of points where the turbine is not damaged. An appropriate
multidimensional detection limit XD will enable timely
shutdown of the turbine, such that the trajectory is kept inside
XA. The states xa, xb are not meant to resemble any specific
states. The examples of these states could be blade bending
and rotor speed.
A popular solution to the protection certificate problem
known in the wind industry is to monitor the rotational speed
of the turbine and shutdown if some predefined threshold is
exceeded. Nonetheless, for newer and larger turbines, it is
anticipated that it will also be necessary to look at multiple
states, which is the aim of this paper.
The results in this paper lean on the concept of a barrier
certificate. It was formulated in [2] and extended in the
context of safety verification with disturbances in [3]. A
polynomial barrier certificate that separates the initial set XD
from the unsafe set XcA, should satisfy a range of conditions
which can be stated as polynomial equalities and inequalities.
These conditions can be transformed using the Positivstellen-
satz [4]. The Positivstellensatz states a relationship between a
semi-algebraic set, and the existence of a certain polynomial
[5]. The conditions of the barrier certificate can be satisfied
if a solution to such a polynomial identity can be found.
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To examine if such a polynomial identity exists, the sum of
squares (SOS) framework can be used [6]. Indeed, [6] shows
how a sum of squares decomposition can be computed using
semidefinite programming (SDP). Consequently, the search
of a sum of squares decomposition becomes numerically
tractable. In [7], the safety verification with barrier cer-
tificates is divided into subproblems with interconnections,
which can be solved independently. Using this approach, the
computational requirements are reduced [7].
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II
lists the nomenclature used in this paper. The problem of
finding protection certificates is formulated in Section III. A
method for computing protection certificates is developed in
Section IV. Protection certificates are used to determine the
safety envelope of a wind turbine in Section V.
II. NOMENCLATURE
We use the following notations. For k ∈ N, k =
{1, . . . , k}. The set of nonnegative reals is denoted by R+,
the set of nonnegative integers by Z+, and the set of natural
numbers by N. For a subset B ⊆ A, Bc denotes the
complement of B in A. For open subsets U ⊆ Rn and
V ⊆ Rm, and a nonnegative integer r, Cr(U, V ) denotes
the set of Cr smooth maps from U to V .
The polynomials with real valued variables are denoted
by Pn and Pmn is a vector of m polynomials. A polynomial
p ∈ Pn is a sum of squares (SOS) if there exist p1, . . . , pk ∈
Pn such that p =
∑k
i=1 p
2
i . The set of sum of squares of
polynomials in n variables is denoted by Σn, with Σmn a
vector of m Σn-polynomials. We shall also use the set of
polynomials in Pn of degree k,
Pn(k) = {p ∈ Pn| deg(p) = k}.
The set of quadratic forms in n variables (homogeneous
polynomials in Pn of degree 2) is denoted by Qn.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this study, we have used the NREL 5MW reference
wind turbine [8]. We will not present the model of a wind
turbine in full [9]. Nonetheless, the model of the drive
train and blade pitching is expounded in Subsection V-C
for experimental study. The full analytical model used
has been verified against FAST simulations of the NREL
5MW turbine. Furthermore, in Table I, we have listed
the states in the description of the wind turbine used in
this work, and in Table II the load limits of the system states.
In an abstract way, we define a wind turbine model during
the shutdown,
x˙ = f(x,w), x(t0) = x0, (1)
where f : Rn × W → Rn with W ⊆ Rm. The subset
W is the set of credible disturbances, i.e., w(t) ∈ W for
all t ∈ R+. We suppose that f is well-defined. Note that
this is the model describing turbine shutdown. Therefore the
input, like e.g. blade pitch, is not regulated by a controller
but predetermined and built into the model. We denote the
States Symbol Unit
Drive train
Rotor angular velocity ωr rad/s
Generator angular velocity ωg rad/s
Drive train torsion angle θ∆ rad
Flapwise blade bending
Flapwise blade tip velocity hvflap,x m/s
Flapwise blade tip displacement hxflap m
Lead-lag blade bending (edgewise)
Lead-lag blade tip angular velocity hωLL,x rad/s
Lead-lag blade tip angle hθLL,x rad
Tower
Tower fore-aft angular velocity tωfa,y rad/s
Tower fore-aft angle tθfa,y rad
Blade-pitch actuator system
Blade-pitch angular velocity ωβ rad/s
Blade-pitch angle θβ rad
Wind model
Wind turbulence component 1 vw,t1 m/s
Wind turbulence component 2 vw,t2 m/s
TABLE I: States of the wind turbine model.
State Limit Value
ωr γr = 2.025 rad/s (−∞ ; γr]
θ∆ γ∆ = 441.42 · 10−3 rad [−γ∆ ; γ∆]
hxflap γflap = 11.57 m [−γflap ; γflap]
hθLL,x γLL = 26.00 · 10−3 rad [−γLL ; γLL]
tθfa,y γfa = 9.54 · 10−3 rad [−γfa ; γfa]
TABLE II: Load limits of the system states
solution of the Cauchy problem (1) for a disturbance w :
R+ →W by φw(x0, t). As explained in Introduction, the set
XA is the admissible state space. We suppose that the state-
constraints are of the type g(x) ≥ 0 for g : Rn → R (as a
minimum g shall be a continuous function). In other words,
each system solution φw(x0, t) with x0 ∈ XD should belong
to the set XA ≡
⋂p
i=1 Vi with Vi = {x ∈ Rn| gi(x) ≥ 0}.
Specifically in our case study, the set XA is defined by the
load limits in Table II.
Definition 1 (Maximal Safety). Let f : Rn×W → Rn with
W ⊆ Rm be Lipschitz continuous. Let XA be a subset of the
state space Rn. We say that XD ⊆ Rn is safe (for the pair
(XA, f)) if for all x0 ∈ XD and w : R+ → W (Lebesgue)
measurable, φw(x0, t) ∈ XA for all t ∈ R+.
We say that XD is maximal safe set (for the pair (XA, f)) if it
is safe and whenever there is a safe set X ′D, then X
′
D ⊆ XD.
Let G be a family of functions on Rn. We denote by 〈G〉
the intersection of 0-sublevel sets of the functions in G,
〈G〉 = {x ∈ R| g(x) ≤ 0 for all g ∈ G}.
The volume of 〈G〉 is denoted by vol 〈G〉,
vol 〈G〉 =
∫
〈G〉
dx.
Definition 2 (Relaxed Maximal Safety). Let f : Rn×W →
Rn, and let XA be a subset of the state space Rn. Suppose
that G is a family of functions. We say that {g1, . . . , gk} ⊆ G
is k-maximal safe in G if
1) 〈g1, ..., gk〉 ≡ 〈{g1, ..., gk}〉 is safe, and
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2) if there is {g′1, ..., g′k} ⊆ G such that 〈g′1, ..., g′k〉 is safe
then vol 〈g′1, ..., g′k〉 ≤ vol 〈g1, ..., gk〉.
In the following, we will study 1-maximal safety in the
family of quadratic functions or polynomials of degree up to
d.
To this end, we recall the concept of a barrier certificate
from [2]. For the subsets XN and XA of Rn, a continuously
differentiable function B that satisfies the conditions:
B(x) ≤ 0 ∀x ∈ XN (2a)
B(x) > 0 ∀x ∈ XcA (2b)
∂B
∂x (x)f(x,w) ≤ 0 ∀(x,w) ∈ B−1(0)×W (2c)
is called a barrier certificate (for the triple (XN, XcA, f)).
If there exists a barrier certificate then the set XN (in fact
also 〈B〉) is safe for the pair (XA, f). In essence, the barrier
certificate is a function that is negative over the safe set and
positive over the unsafe set (by (2a) and (2b)). Furthermore,
by (2c), the derivative along the flow of the system, where
B(x) = 0, is negative or zero. This means that the system
can never cross this “barrier” where B(x) = 0 and thus
B(x(t)) ≤ 0 ∀t, which means that the system will never be
unsafe.
If the set B−1(0)×W in the universal quantifier of (2c)
is replaced by the set X ×W , where X is the state space,
the function B will be called a weak barrier certificate.
Let B be the set of all barrier certificates. For a subset
G ⊆ C1(Rn,R), we define BG = B ∩ G.
We are in place to formulate the problem studied in this
paper. For a b ∈ Rn, let Qn(b) denote the set of the functions
of the form
g := gQ : Rn → R; x 7→ (x− b)TQ−1(x− b)− 1 (3)
with a positive definite matrix Q.
We strive to find g ∈ BQn(b) such that the volume of its
0-sublevel set is maximal, i.e.,
g = arg max
h∈BQn(b)
vol 〈h〉 , (4)
which means g is 1-maximal safe in BQn(b). We shall call
the function g in (4) a protection certificate (for the triple
(XN, XA, f)). The 0-level set of g can then be used as the
detection limit XD in Fig. 1.
IV. COMPUTATION OF PROTECTION CERTIFICATES
To find a protection certificate, we re-formulate the prob-
lem of computing the protection certificate (4) to an SOS
program, which will be described briefly in this section.
A. SOS Programming
By [10], a polynomial p of degree 2d belongs to Σn if
and only if there exist a positive semi-definite matrix P and
a vector of monomials Z which contains all monomials of
x of degree ≤ d such that p(x) = ZT(x)PZ(x).
The existence of an SOS decomposition of a polynomial
can be expressed as an SDP feasibility problem. Therefore,
the formulation of a problem as an SOS makes the problem
computationally tractable.
Proposition 1 ([11]). Given a finite set {pi ∈ Pn}i∈m, the
existence of a set of scalars {ai ∈ R}i∈m such that
p0 +
m∑
i=1
aipi ∈ Σn (5)
is a Linear Matrix Inequality (LMI) feasibility problem.
In summary, we strive to formulate a protection certificate
problem as an SOS program. In detail, let k, l ∈ N, let αi,0
and αi,j ∈ Pn for (i, j) ∈ l × k, and let wj ∈ R. An SOS
program is the problem
arg min
(c1,...,ck)∈Rk
k∑
j=1
wjcj subject to
αi,0 +
k∑
j=1
αi,jcj ∈ Σn, ∀i ∈ l. (6)
As explained above, such a problem can be effectively solved
by means of SDP.
B. Certificates for Positiveness
The next task is to convert the problem of existence of a
polynomial barrier certificate to SOS programming. The sub-
sequent proposition formalizes the problem of constrained
positivity of polynomials, which is a direct result of applying
Positivstellensatz.
Proposition 2 ([12]). Let {ai}i∈k and {bi}i∈l belong to Pn,
then
p(x) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ Rn : ai(x) = 0, ∀i = 1, 2, ..., k
and bj(x) ≥ 0, ∀j = 1, 2, ..., l (7)
is satisfied, if the following holds
∃r1, r2, . . . , rk ∈ Pn and ∃s0, s1, . . . , sl ∈ Σn
such that
p =
∑k
i=1 riai +
∑l
i=1 sibi + s0. (8)
The following observation will be instrumental. A poly-
nomial p ∈ Pn is strictly positive (p(x) > 0 ∀x ∈ Rn), if
there exists a  > 0 such that(
p(x)− ) ∈ Σn. (9)
C. Polynomial Barrier Certificates BPn
To compute barrier certificates using SOS programming,
we restrict the vector fields to be polynomial. Furthermore,
the admissible set and the normal operation set will be
semialgebraic sets, i.e., they will be given by polynomial
inequalities. Let gN : Rn → RkN , gA : Rn → RkA ,
gW : Rm → RkW , and gX : Rn → RkX , for some
kXN , kXA , kX , kW ∈ N, be vectors of polynomials with coor-
dinate functions gi ∈ Pn; for example, gN = (g1, . . . , gkN) ∈
PkNn . Then
XN ≡ {x ∈ Rn|gN(x) ≥ 0}, (10a)
XcA ≡ {x ∈ Rn|gA(x) ≥ 0}, (10b)
W ≡ {w ∈ Rm|gW (w) ≥ 0}, (10c)
X ≡ {x ∈ Rn|gX(x) ≥ 0}, (10d)
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where X is the considered domain of the state space and the
inequalities in (10) are satisfied coordinate-wise.
By Proposition 2, we can characterise the set BPn using
the sum of squares.
Proposition 3. A polynomial B ∈ Pn is a barrier certificate
for the triple (XN, XcA, f) if there exist 1, 2 > 0, B ∈ Pn,
sN ∈ ΣkNn , sA ∈ ΣkAn , sX ∈ ΣkXn , and sW ∈ ΣkWm such that
−B − sTNgN, (11a)
B − 1 − sTAgA, and (11b)
− ∂B
∂x
f − 2 − sTW gW − sTXgX (11c)
are sum of squares.
In conclusion, by Proposition 2, (11a)-(11c) satisfies each
condition in (2a)-(2c). Whether a polynomial B satisfies the
conditions (11) is a feasibility problem in SOS programming
as specified by (6).
We shall denote the set of all polynomials satisfying (11)
by B¯Pn . It follows from Proposition 3 that B¯Pn ⊆ BPn .
D. Maximum Volume of Ellipsoid
The last ingredient necessary to compute the protection
certificate (4) is the calculation of the volume of an ellipsoid.
Let gQ ∈ Qn(b), then the volume of the ellipsoid 〈gQ〉 is
vol 〈gQ〉 = 4
3
pi
√
det(Q).
Hence, the volume of an ellipsoid can be maximised by
maximising det(Q). Nonetheless, this is a nonlinear opti-
misation problem. [13] shows that introducing log det(Q)
makes the maximum volume problem convex. The resulting
optimisation problem becomes
max log det(Q)
s.t. Q  0, 〈gQ〉 ⊆ 〈B〉 , B ∈ B¯Pn ,
(12)
where Q  0 signifies that Q is positive definite. According
to Proposition 2, if there is sQ ∈ Σn such that
−B(x) + sQ
(
(x− b)TQ−1(x− b)− 1) ∈ Σn (13)
then 〈gQ〉 ⊆ 〈B〉.
The volume maximisation (12) is not linear; although, it
is convex. We strive to solve the above problem by means
of SDP. Therefore, we will replace the volume of an ellipse
by a linear substitute.
At the outset, observe that the volume of an ellipsoid
is proportional to the product of magnitudes of its semi-
principal axes. This is because the eigenvalues of Q are
equal to the squares of the semi-principal axes. To relax
the nonlinear problem of finding the maximum volume over
ellipsoids, the linear problem of maximum sum of the semi-
principal axes squared, i.e., the sum of the eigenvalues of Q,
is considered.
Recall that for an ellipsoid gQ, the sum of the eigenvalues
of Q is equal to the trace of Q. By replacing the trace of Q
with the trace of Q−1, the maximisation of the semi-principal
axes is stated as a minimisation problem:
min Tr Q−1
s.t. Q  0, B ∈ B¯Pn , 〈gQ〉 ⊆ 〈B〉 .
(14)
The above optimisation problem is linear in the objective,
thus indeed corresponds to SDP.
In conclusion, the above objective of minimising the sum
of magnitudes of the semi-principal axes is not identical to
the objective of volume maximisation. However, the trace of
Q−1 does provide a similar measure and can directly be used
in SDP.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
In our terminology, the ellipsoid 〈gQ〉 = {x ∈
Rn| xTQ−1x − 1 ≤ 0} ⊆ XA with the positive definite
matrix Q of maximal trace is called a safety envelope.
A protection certificate is a function B that satisfies the
optimisation problem (14).
A. Safety Envelope for Complete Wind Turbine
The complete polynomial model of the examined wind
turbine with emergency shutdown procedure as described in
Section III includes 13 states with polynomial degree 12.
Driving turbulence noise is regarded as a disturbance. The
high polynomial degree of the model is due to the degree of
the polynomials representing aerodynamic coefficients, Cp
and Ct.
Using the formulation of a weak barrier certificate, the
search for a wind turbine safety envelope is stated as demon-
strated in Section IV. The SOS programming for the safety
envelope, given the complete wind turbine system and the
trace safety envelope optimisation criterion, is formulated in
SOS Program 1.
SOS Program 1 Complete wind turbine system
min TrQ−1
over B ∈ P13, Q ∈ S+(13),
s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6 ∈ Σ13, sX,D ∈ Σ1414
s.t. B − s1(ωr − γr) ∈ Σ13
B − s2(θ∆2 − γ∆2) ∈ Σ13
B − s3(hxflap2 − γflap2) ∈ Σ13
B − s4(hθLL,x2 − γLL2) ∈ Σ13
B − s5(tθfa,y2 − γfa2) ∈ Σ13
−B + s6gQ ∈ Σ13
− ∂B
∂x
f − sTX,DgX,D ∈ Σ14
where
S+(n) is the set of n× n positive definite matrices, and
gQ(x) = x
TQ−1x− 1.
3676
In SOS Program 1, f is the wind turbine system, B is
the protection certificate, Q is the matrix defining the safety
envelope, {γr, γ∆, γflap, γLL, γfa} are the load limits of the
chosen states, and gX,W = (gX, gW) ∈ P1314 ×P14 is a vector
of polynomials defining the state space and disturbance set
{(x,w) ∈ R13 × R| gX(x) ≤ 0, gW(w) ≤ 0}. (15)
The bounded wind disturbance and bounded state space
are defined as elements in the set (15). Relating to the
illustration in Fig. 1, the load limits are given by the
admissible set XA and either 〈gQ〉 or 〈B〉 can be used as
detection limit XD since 〈gQ〉 ⊆ 〈B〉.
As the model f is of relative high dimension and the
degrees of the polynomials are at the same time relatively
high, the SOS program becomes very complex. A single
constraint such as s1 ∈ Σ13 generates a matrix inequality
P1  0; with 13 states and polynomial degree 2d = 12, the
size of P1 becomes(
n+ d
d
)
×
(
n+ d
d
)
= 27132× 27132. (16)
With 64 bit double representation of the elements in MATLAB
this requires 5.9 GB of memory. Furthermore, a decision
matrix of this size has 5.2 million decision variables.
In the following, the problem is divided into subproblems,
which are solved individually [7].
B. Safety Envelopes of Separate Subsystems
The model is divided into subsystems which are studied
individually. As the subsystems are examined separately the
interconnections between the subsystems are not directly
included in the calculation of the safety envelopes. Inter-
connections which are considered essential are introduced
as unknown bounded disturbances to a given subsystem.
The complete model is divided into the following sub-
systems: the drive train and blade-pitching, the tower top
bending, the flapwise blade bending, and the lead-lag blade
bending. The drive train and blade-pitching subsystem in-
cludes the drive train, blade-pitch model and the aerodynamic
properties of the rotor.
The subsystems and their interconnections are illustrated
in Fig. 2. The interconnections are indicated by arrows
between the involved subsystems. The solid arrow is the
real wind disturbance, the curly arrows - the fictitious dis-
turbances (as replacements for the interconnections), and the
dashed arrows - the interconnections, which are neglected.
C. Illustration - Drive Train and Blade Pitching
In the following, the drive train and blade-pitching sub-
system will be called the drive train for short. The states
of the drive train are xr = (ωr, ωg, θ∆, θβ , ωβ). This
subsystem incorporates the emergency shutdown procedure
through the blade-pitch model and the aerodynamic functions
and is thus the most complex of the subsystems. The drive
train is in the complete wind turbine in Fig. 2 connected to
the lead-lag bending of the blades and tower top velocity.
The lead-lag bending of the blades affects the rotor torque;
whereas, the tower top velocity influences the wind speed
experienced by the rotor. These interconnections after the
separation of subsystems are not included in the following
drive train model. The drive train subsystem x˙r = f r(xr, w)
is
ω˙r = J
−1
r [τaero −Brωr −Kaθ∆ −Ba(ωr −Nωg)]
ω˙g = J
−1
g [KaNθ∆ +BaN(ωr −Nωg)−Bgωg]
θ˙∆ = ωr −Nωg
θ˙β = ωβ
ω˙β = −0.6ωβ − 0.0894θβ
(17)
with τaero = 12ρARvw
2Cq(vw, ωr, β) and β = −θβ + 90.
Jr,g is rotor and generator inertia respectively, Br,a,g are
friction constants, N is the gear ratio and Ka is the drive
train torsional stiffness. The state space X , unsafe set XcA
and disturbance set W of the drive train subsystem are
X =
 xr ∈ R
5
0.5 rad/s ≤ ωr ≤ 3 rad/s,
0.5 · 97 rad/s ≤ ωg ≤ 3 · 97 rad/s,
−0.5 rad ≤ θ∆ ≤ 0.5 rad,
0◦ ≤ θβ ≤ 90◦,
−20◦/s ≤ ωβ ≤ 20◦/s

XcA = {xr ∈ X| ωr − γr ≥ 0} ∪
{
xr ∈ X| θ∆2 − γ∆2 ≥ 0
}
W = {vw ∈ R| 15 m/s ≤ vw ≤ 25 m/s} ,
(18)
where γr is the load limit of the rotor velocity and γ∆ the
load limit of the drive train torsion.
The state space in the analysis has been limited such
that the rotational speed of the rotor is considered in the
interval [0.5 rad/s, 3 rad/s]; and because of the gearing,
the rotational speed of the generator is examined in the
interval [0.5 · 97 rad/s, 3 · 97 rad/s]. Consequently, it is
assumed that the wind turbine cannot become unsafe when
the rotor angular velocity is below 0.5 rad/s. Additionally,
it is assumed that the blade-pitch angle θβ is limited to
the interval [0◦, 90◦]. The wind disturbance is bounded such
that it can only take values in the range 15 m/s to 25 m/s.
To find a safety envelope of the drive train, the technique
developed in Section IV is used to transform the safety
envelope optimisation into an SOS Program 2.
Likewise, the procedure demonstrated above has been used
for the three remaining subsystems in Fig. 2.
SOS Program 2 Drive train subsystem
min TrQ−1
over B ∈ P5, Q ∈ S+(5), s1, s3 ∈ Σ5, sX,D ∈ Σ66
s.t. B − s1(ωr − γr) ∈ Σ5
B − s3(θ∆2 − γ∆2) ∈ Σ5
−B + s6gQ ∈ Σ5
− ∂B
∂xr
f r − sTX,DgrX,D ∈ Σ6.
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Lead-lag blade bending Tower
Drive train & pitching Flapwise blade bending
(ωr, β)
(ω˙r, ωr, β)hθLL,x
tvfa,x
(tv˙fa,x,
tvfa,x)
hxflap
tvfa,x
(ωr, β)vw
τaero
vw
Faero
vw
vw
Faero
Fig. 2: The four separate subsystems are illustrated by boxes. The solid arrow is the real wind disturbance, the curly arrows
the fictitious disturbances and the dashed arrows the interconnections which are neglected. tvfa,x is the forward velocity of
the tower, which can be calculated from the tower angular velocity state and the length of the tower: tvfa,x = Ltωfa,y .
VI. DISCUSSION
To use this method on a real wind turbine, there are
some additional considerations to be made. For example,
the safety envelope in the illustrational example above, is
calculated using a limited wind range and rotor speed. For
a real turbine, the full range of possible wind velocities
and rotor speed would have to be included. It would be
straightforward to include this. However, a larger disturbance
range will inevitably lead to a smaller safety envelope.
The operational control of the wind turbine in power pro-
duction mode is divided into regions determined by the wind
speed. In order to cover normal operation, it is beneficial
or even necessary to design a safety envelope specifically
to each region of the operational controller. In the end it
will be an “engineering tradeoff” to choose the disturbance
range and number of operational regions. It is not the aim of
this paper to evaluate further on implementation of specific
tradeoff’s.
Another assumption in the above example, is that all states
are available, either measured or estimated. This might not
always be the case. A smaller number of sensors will also
lead to less certainty about the turbine state, and thereby a
smaller safety envelope. Selection of the number of states
for the use in the safety certificate is also an “engineering
tradeoff”, and the developed method provides the optimised
safety envelope with the given sensors.
The computational complexity of the developed method
is relatively high as described in Section V-A. However,
it should be noted that it is essential to separate offline
and online computational complexity. Online complexity
should be very low, since it is necessary for the turbine to
check the safety at each time step. This complies well with
the developed method, since checking safety only requires
evaluating if gQ in (3) is negative. The complexity for finding
the protection certificate is allowed to be much higher, since
the analysis can be done offline.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The paper showed that a multivariate model-based safety
supervisor system can improve the safety guarantee and
increase the uptime of large wind turbines, compared to
simple univariate safety supervisors often used today. The
implemented safety supervisor demonstrated the ability to
commence emergency shutdowns prior to unsafe situations
and to stay passive during normal operation of the wind
turbine. Using the concept of barrier certificates, the search
for safety envelopes can be formulated as a computationally
tractable optimisation algorithm.
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